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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
As public concerns increase over global warming caused by the burning of fossil fuels, 
natural gas is gaining a lot of attention for the lowest emission of carbon dioxide among the 
fossil fuels. Thus, governments implementing national or regional plans to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions may encourage its use to displace other fossil fuels. According to 
the Energy Information Administration, the worldwide natural gas consumption in 2030 
will increase by about one and a half times as much as in 2006 (EIA, 2009), so that the 
number and frequency of seaborne transportation of liquefied natural gas (LNG) are 
expected to increase significantly around the world. In fact, there are a lot of projects to 
build new receiving terminals in the United States. Also, natural gas consumption is 
expected to rise rapidly in China and India. With such a growing global demand, recent 
LNG carriers (LNGCs) become larger up to a 266,000 m3 cargo capacity, which are referred 
to as Q-Max vessels. 
Due to the above change in the situation, there has recently been considerable interest 
concerning possible risks involved in the LNG carrier operations, though seaborne 
transportation of LNG has been conducted with a very good safety record since 1959. 
Hence, public authorities have raised their awareness of concern about the possibility of 
large-scale LNG spill hazards caused by accidental events or intentional attacks. As a result, 
a number of consequence analyses have been carried out in recent years in order to propose 
models and approaches or to assess hazards resulting from an unconfined LNG spill over 
water (Luketa-Hanlin, 2006). However, these studies showed a broad range of results due to 
their differences in models, approaches and assumptions, since the physics involved in such 
LNG spills and related phenomena is very complicated. In addition, because of the lack of 
experimental data for a large-scale LNG spill and subsequent combustion and/or dispersion 
events, there are many theoretical and experimental gaps related to understanding of the 
dynamics and limitations in predicting the associated hazards. Therefore, consequence 
assessment methods based on a combination of theoretical formulations and empirical 
relationships derived from laboratory and small-scale field experiments are the only 
practical measure to predict the hazards associated with large-scale LNG spills on water. 
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On the other hand, a broad range of results of these studies indicates how important it is to 
use appropriate assumptions, data, and models in trying to make an accurate assessment of 
hazards from an LNG spill. Although the results of recent consequence studies were 
compared in a few publications (Hightower et al., 2004), there was no comparison study on 
consequence models under the same scenarios in terms of LNG properties, release 
assumptions and weather conditions. Therefore, the current author compared and evaluated 
consequence models for pool fire hazards involving an LNG spill on water in order to 
clarify their characteristics (Oka & Ota, 2008). 
In the above comparison study, attention was paid to thermal radiation hazards from pool 
fires, because there is a high possibility that an ignition source immediately after breaching a 
tank will be available (Hightower et al., 2004). Hence, the sensitivity analysis of a spill and 
the subsequent pool fire hazards to the hole size breached in a membrane-type tank of a 
conventional size LNGC (125,000 m3 cargo capacity) were carried out using three major 
consequence assessment methods developed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) (FERC, 2004), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) (Hightower et al., 2004) and Fay 
(Fay, 2003). These methods were chosen based on an in-depth review of the recent literature 
available to the public. Through the sensitivity analysis, it was found that the FERC method 
was most appropriate for practical consequence analyses of incidents involving large-scale 
LNG spills on water from the practical viewpoint of applicability to any breach size. 
Recent LNGCs are designed to have as much as a 266,000 m3 cargo capacity, so that it is 
important to evaluate how much the extent of the hazard impact would increase due to the 
enlarged size and capacity of such carriers. Thus, thermal radiation hazards from pool fires 
involving spills from one of the latest and largest LNGCs (250,000m3 cargo capacity) were 
assessed using the recommended FERC method, and the results were discussed in 
comparison with those for the conventional size LNGC. As a result, it was found that the 
maximum thermal hazard distance was only about 24 % longer than that for the 
conventional LNGC, while the spill volume was twice as much (Oka & Ota, 2008). 
When the author focused on estimating LNG spill hazards from the latest LNGC, similar 
hazard assessments had not been covered at least in the publicly available literature. 
However, in almost the same period the U.S. Department of Energy requested that SNL 
conduct analyses of possible spill hazards from a breach of the latest LNGC (Luketa et al., 
2008). The results of both studies were published at the same time. This updated SNL study 
presented somewhat different results in that the thermal hazard distances increased by 
approximately 7–8 % due to the increase in hydrostatic head and tank volume for the new, 
larger LNGC. In the scenarios used in the SNL studies (Luketa et al., 2008), the nominal 
breach size and the total spill volume from a single tank were determined as 5 m2 and 41,000 
m3, respectively, so that a smaller breach size and a larger spill volume were used than those 
in the other study (Oka & Ota, 2008). Hence, for quantitative comparison, the current author 
carried out consequence analyses of pool fire hazards following an LNG spill from a 
breached tank of the conventional and latest LNGCs under the same scenarios as in the SNL 
studies (Oka, 2009). It was found that, as a whole, the thermal hazard consequences by the 
SNL method were in fairly good agreement with those by the FERC method. 
 
1.2 Scope of the present study 
The principal LNG hazards of interest for the present study are those posed by thermal 
radiation and flammable vapor dispersion resulting from unconfined LNG spills on water. 
 
Cryogenic burns and asphyxiation are typically localized to LNG transport and storage 
areas, so that such secondary hazards are outside the scope of this study. 
The two previous studies for the latest LNGC by the FERC method (Oka & Ota, 2008; Oka, 
2009) were carried out under the following scenarios. In the first study (Oka & Ota, 2008), 
predicted consequences were compared only when the hole diameters were 1, 3 and 5 m as 
typical hole sizes, which were chosen from the recent literature on the assessment of the 
impacts of large-scale release from the conventional type LNGC. In the second study (Oka, 
2009), two breach sizes of 5 and 12 m2 were used as nominal tank breaches for near-shore 
and offshore LNG marine import operations, respectively, so as to compare the updated 
SNL study (Luketa et al., 2008). Therefore, no sensitivity analysis of pool fire hazards to the 
hole size has been carried out for the latest LNGC. 
As for flammable vapor dispersion hazards, as far as the author knows, there is no study to 
assess consequences predicted by the FERC method for the latest LNGC. Though the 
sensitivity analysis of spills and the subsequent dispersion hazards to the breach size were 
conducted for the conventional size LNGC using the FERC method (Qiao et al., 2006), the 
averaging time used to estimate flammable gas concentrations was much larger than the 
recommended value in the FERC method. Thus, it is interesting to evaluate the sensitivity 
using the FERC method composed of all the recommended models and assumptions for the 
latest LNGC. 
The present work considers the sensitivity of the flammable vapor and thermal radiation 
hazards to the hole diameter under release scenarios that a hole can develop just above the 
waterline level in the event of a breach of a single tank on the conventional and latest 
LNGCs. Under current circumstances, from the practical viewpoint of applicability to any 
breach size, the FERC method has been recommended in the previous studies (Oka & Ota, 
2008; Oka, 2009), so that the present consequence analyses are carried out using the same 
method. 
 
2. Overview of potential consequences 
Currently, the potential for the dynamics and dispersion of a large spill and the associated 
hazards are not fully understood. As will be shown in Fig. 1 later, existing experimental data 
on LNG spill dynamics, dispersion, and burning over water cover only small amount of spill 
volumes that are two to three orders of magnitude less than those postulated in the recent 
literature (Luketa-Hanlin, 2006). 
 
2.1 Brief description on major hazards of an LNG spill on water 
The potential hazards associated with LNG spills include cryogenic damage caused by 
direct contact, pressure increase due to rapid phase transition (RPT), flash fires, pool fires, 
deflagrations and detonations. Because of its extremely low temperature, direct contact with 
LNG will result in brittle fracture of the ship's structure, which may cause cascading 
damage to additional LNG tanks. When LNG comes in contact with water at a significantly 
higher temperature than the boiling point of LNG, there is the possibility of RPT, which is a 
nearly instantaneous transition from the liquid to vapor phases and produces an associated 
rapid pressure increase. The impacts of RPT will be localized near the spill source and 
should not cause extensive structural damage. 
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On the other hand, a broad range of results of these studies indicates how important it is to 
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hazards from an LNG spill. Although the results of recent consequence studies were 
compared in a few publications (Hightower et al., 2004), there was no comparison study on 
consequence models under the same scenarios in terms of LNG properties, release 
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available to the public. Through the sensitivity analysis, it was found that the FERC method 
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Recent LNGCs are designed to have as much as a 266,000 m3 cargo capacity, so that it is 
important to evaluate how much the extent of the hazard impact would increase due to the 
enlarged size and capacity of such carriers. Thus, thermal radiation hazards from pool fires 
involving spills from one of the latest and largest LNGCs (250,000m3 cargo capacity) were 
assessed using the recommended FERC method, and the results were discussed in 
comparison with those for the conventional size LNGC. As a result, it was found that the 
maximum thermal hazard distance was only about 24 % longer than that for the 
conventional LNGC, while the spill volume was twice as much (Oka & Ota, 2008). 
When the author focused on estimating LNG spill hazards from the latest LNGC, similar 
hazard assessments had not been covered at least in the publicly available literature. 
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radiation and flammable vapor dispersion resulting from unconfined LNG spills on water. 
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conducted for the conventional size LNGC using the FERC method (Qiao et al., 2006), the 
averaging time used to estimate flammable gas concentrations was much larger than the 
recommended value in the FERC method. Thus, it is interesting to evaluate the sensitivity 
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LNGCs. Under current circumstances, from the practical viewpoint of applicability to any 
breach size, the FERC method has been recommended in the previous studies (Oka & Ota, 
2008; Oka, 2009), so that the present consequence analyses are carried out using the same 
method. 
 
2. Overview of potential consequences 
Currently, the potential for the dynamics and dispersion of a large spill and the associated 
hazards are not fully understood. As will be shown in Fig. 1 later, existing experimental data 
on LNG spill dynamics, dispersion, and burning over water cover only small amount of spill 
volumes that are two to three orders of magnitude less than those postulated in the recent 
literature (Luketa-Hanlin, 2006). 
 
2.1 Brief description on major hazards of an LNG spill on water 
The potential hazards associated with LNG spills include cryogenic damage caused by 
direct contact, pressure increase due to rapid phase transition (RPT), flash fires, pool fires, 
deflagrations and detonations. Because of its extremely low temperature, direct contact with 
LNG will result in brittle fracture of the ship's structure, which may cause cascading 
damage to additional LNG tanks. When LNG comes in contact with water at a significantly 
higher temperature than the boiling point of LNG, there is the possibility of RPT, which is a 
nearly instantaneous transition from the liquid to vapor phases and produces an associated 
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LNG is comprised mostly of methane, so that LNG vapor is flammable in air approximately 
at 5 to 15 % by volume. At a 5 % concentration of gas in air, LNG vapor is at its lower 
flammability limit (LFL). Below the LFL, the cloud is too dilute for ignition. At a 15 % 
concentration of gas in air, LNG vapor is at its upper flammability limit (UFL), so that the 
cloud is too rich in LNG for ignition above the UFL. 
The evaporating natural gas in the above range of combustible gas-air concentrations will 
burn above the LNG pool when it ignites immediately after LNG release. The resulting pool 
fire would spread as the LNG pool expands away from its source and continues 
evaporating. If released LNG does not ignite immediately, the LNG will form a vapor cloud 
that may drift some distance from the spill site at roughly the wind speed. Once it warms 
above approximately -108 ºC, LNG vapor will become less dense than air and tend to rise 
and disperse more rapidly. However, LNG vapor at its normal boiling point -162 ºC is 1.5 
times denser than air at 25 ºC. Typically, LNG vapor released into the atmosphere will 
remain negatively buoyant until after it disperses below its LFL. Therefore, the displacement 
of air by LNG vapor may cause asphyxiation as well as lung damage from breathing the 
cold vapor. 
In the case of delayed ignition at downwind locations to which the spill vapor might spread, 
a flash fire will occur. This is a short duration fire that burns the vapor already mixed with 
air to flammable concentrations. The flame front may burn back through the vapor cloud to 
the spill site, resulting in a pool fire. A flash fire will burn slowly and is unlikely to generate 
damaging overpressures when it occurs in an unconfined space.  
Explosions arising from combustion of flammable fuel-air mixtures are classified as either a 
detonation or a deflagration. Detonations generate very high overpressures, and hence are 
more damaging than deflagrations. It is pointed out that weak ignition of natural gas vapor 
in an unconfined and unobstructed environment is highly unlikely to result in deflagration- 
to-detonation transition (DDT). This transition is more likely in an environment with 
confinement such as with closely spaced obstacles, so that damaging overpressures could 
result from explosions in a confined space in cases that the flammable vapor leaks into a 
confined space inside LNGCs or other congested structures and then ignites. 
 
2.2 Review of experiments on large-scale LNG spills 
This subsection briefly reviews experiments on the vapor dispersion, pool fire and vapor 
cloud fire which are formed from unconfined LNG spills onto water. In reference to recent 
review papers  (Luketa-Hanlin, 2006; Koopman & Ermak, 2007; Raj, 2007), only the largest 
spill volume tests are outlined chronologically in the following. 
In 1973, the Esso Research and Engineering Company and the American Petroleum Institute 
carried out LNG dispersion tests in Matagorda Bay, Texas (Feldbauer et al., 1972). Volumes 
ranging from 0.73 to 10.2 m3 were spilled. Pool radii ranging from 7 to 14 m were visually 
observed, and visible vapor clouds were very low in height compared to their lateral extent. 
In 1978, the U.S. Coast Guard China Lake tests (Schneider, 1980) were performed at the 
Naval Weapon Center (NWC) in China Lake, California in order to measure the thermal 
radiation output of pool fires as well as vapor cloud fires. The volumes of LNG ranged from 
3 to 5.7 m3 were released towards the middle of an unconfined water surface of a pond. The 
effective pool diameter was up to 15 m, and the flame lengths ranged from 25 to 55 m. In 
1980, Shell Research conducted a series of experiments at Maplin Sands in England to obtain 
dispersion and thermal radiation data for 20 spills of 5 to 20 m3 of LNG on the surface of the 
 
sea (Blackmore et al., 1982; Mizner & Eyre, 1983). An effective pool diameter of 30 m was 
calculated by approximating the flame base area as an ellipse. A pool fire was formed in one 
test, but it continued only for a few seconds before the fuel was consumed. Therefore, a fully 
developed pool fire was not achieved. At the same time as the Maplin Sands tests, the Burro 
series tests were conducted independently by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
(LLNL) at NWC (Koopman et al., 1982). The main objective of the Burro series was to obtain 
extensive data on LNG vapor dispersion under a variety of meteorological conditions. A 
total of eight LNG release onto water were performed with spill volumes ranging from 24 to 
39 m3. The pool radius measured in the tests was up to 5 m. The Coyote series tests (Rodean 
et al., 1984) followed the Burro series in 1981 so as to measure the characteristics of large 
vapor cloud fires and obtain more dispersion data from LNG spills ranging from 14.6 to 
28 m3 onto water. It was observed that the flame propagated toward the spill source and 
subsequently a pool fire occurred. However, measurements were not taken in the 
experiment of the flame propagation. After the Burro and Coyote series, the Falcon series 
tests (Brown et al., 1990) were conducted by LLNL in 1987. The main goal of the 
experiments were to provide a database on LNG vapor dispersion from spills in an 
environment with obstacles and to assess the effectiveness of vapor fences for mitigating 
dispersion hazards. The Falcon tests have been the largest spills so far, with release rates up 
to 30 m3/min and spill volumes ranging from 21 to 66 m3. 
Figure 1 shows a comparison of the spill sizes tested to date with possible spill volume from 
a single LNG cargo tank through a hole just above the waterline level. It can be seen from 
this figure that the experimental tests were performed on considerably smaller scales 
compared with an LNGC tank size. In other words, there is a large disparity between the 
available experimental data and the scales of interest for consequence assessments, so that 
there are gaps and limitations in understanding and predicting the hazards associated with 
large-scale spills from a cargo tank. Therefore, a lot of consequence assessment methods for 
practical use can provide only rough estimates of the magnitude of effects for incidents 
involving large LNG release on water.  
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 Fig. 1. Logarithmic scale comparison of spill volume level in field experiments with that of a 
possible cargo spill from a single tank of the latest LNGC. 
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LNG is comprised mostly of methane, so that LNG vapor is flammable in air approximately 
at 5 to 15 % by volume. At a 5 % concentration of gas in air, LNG vapor is at its lower 
flammability limit (LFL). Below the LFL, the cloud is too dilute for ignition. At a 15 % 
concentration of gas in air, LNG vapor is at its upper flammability limit (UFL), so that the 
cloud is too rich in LNG for ignition above the UFL. 
The evaporating natural gas in the above range of combustible gas-air concentrations will 
burn above the LNG pool when it ignites immediately after LNG release. The resulting pool 
fire would spread as the LNG pool expands away from its source and continues 
evaporating. If released LNG does not ignite immediately, the LNG will form a vapor cloud 
that may drift some distance from the spill site at roughly the wind speed. Once it warms 
above approximately -108 ºC, LNG vapor will become less dense than air and tend to rise 
and disperse more rapidly. However, LNG vapor at its normal boiling point -162 ºC is 1.5 
times denser than air at 25 ºC. Typically, LNG vapor released into the atmosphere will 
remain negatively buoyant until after it disperses below its LFL. Therefore, the displacement 
of air by LNG vapor may cause asphyxiation as well as lung damage from breathing the 
cold vapor. 
In the case of delayed ignition at downwind locations to which the spill vapor might spread, 
a flash fire will occur. This is a short duration fire that burns the vapor already mixed with 
air to flammable concentrations. The flame front may burn back through the vapor cloud to 
the spill site, resulting in a pool fire. A flash fire will burn slowly and is unlikely to generate 
damaging overpressures when it occurs in an unconfined space.  
Explosions arising from combustion of flammable fuel-air mixtures are classified as either a 
detonation or a deflagration. Detonations generate very high overpressures, and hence are 
more damaging than deflagrations. It is pointed out that weak ignition of natural gas vapor 
in an unconfined and unobstructed environment is highly unlikely to result in deflagration- 
to-detonation transition (DDT). This transition is more likely in an environment with 
confinement such as with closely spaced obstacles, so that damaging overpressures could 
result from explosions in a confined space in cases that the flammable vapor leaks into a 
confined space inside LNGCs or other congested structures and then ignites. 
 
2.2 Review of experiments on large-scale LNG spills 
This subsection briefly reviews experiments on the vapor dispersion, pool fire and vapor 
cloud fire which are formed from unconfined LNG spills onto water. In reference to recent 
review papers  (Luketa-Hanlin, 2006; Koopman & Ermak, 2007; Raj, 2007), only the largest 
spill volume tests are outlined chronologically in the following. 
In 1973, the Esso Research and Engineering Company and the American Petroleum Institute 
carried out LNG dispersion tests in Matagorda Bay, Texas (Feldbauer et al., 1972). Volumes 
ranging from 0.73 to 10.2 m3 were spilled. Pool radii ranging from 7 to 14 m were visually 
observed, and visible vapor clouds were very low in height compared to their lateral extent. 
In 1978, the U.S. Coast Guard China Lake tests (Schneider, 1980) were performed at the 
Naval Weapon Center (NWC) in China Lake, California in order to measure the thermal 
radiation output of pool fires as well as vapor cloud fires. The volumes of LNG ranged from 
3 to 5.7 m3 were released towards the middle of an unconfined water surface of a pond. The 
effective pool diameter was up to 15 m, and the flame lengths ranged from 25 to 55 m. In 
1980, Shell Research conducted a series of experiments at Maplin Sands in England to obtain 
dispersion and thermal radiation data for 20 spills of 5 to 20 m3 of LNG on the surface of the 
 
sea (Blackmore et al., 1982; Mizner & Eyre, 1983). An effective pool diameter of 30 m was 
calculated by approximating the flame base area as an ellipse. A pool fire was formed in one 
test, but it continued only for a few seconds before the fuel was consumed. Therefore, a fully 
developed pool fire was not achieved. At the same time as the Maplin Sands tests, the Burro 
series tests were conducted independently by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
(LLNL) at NWC (Koopman et al., 1982). The main objective of the Burro series was to obtain 
extensive data on LNG vapor dispersion under a variety of meteorological conditions. A 
total of eight LNG release onto water were performed with spill volumes ranging from 24 to 
39 m3. The pool radius measured in the tests was up to 5 m. The Coyote series tests (Rodean 
et al., 1984) followed the Burro series in 1981 so as to measure the characteristics of large 
vapor cloud fires and obtain more dispersion data from LNG spills ranging from 14.6 to 
28 m3 onto water. It was observed that the flame propagated toward the spill source and 
subsequently a pool fire occurred. However, measurements were not taken in the 
experiment of the flame propagation. After the Burro and Coyote series, the Falcon series 
tests (Brown et al., 1990) were conducted by LLNL in 1987. The main goal of the 
experiments were to provide a database on LNG vapor dispersion from spills in an 
environment with obstacles and to assess the effectiveness of vapor fences for mitigating 
dispersion hazards. The Falcon tests have been the largest spills so far, with release rates up 
to 30 m3/min and spill volumes ranging from 21 to 66 m3. 
Figure 1 shows a comparison of the spill sizes tested to date with possible spill volume from 
a single LNG cargo tank through a hole just above the waterline level. It can be seen from 
this figure that the experimental tests were performed on considerably smaller scales 
compared with an LNGC tank size. In other words, there is a large disparity between the 
available experimental data and the scales of interest for consequence assessments, so that 
there are gaps and limitations in understanding and predicting the hazards associated with 
large-scale spills from a cargo tank. Therefore, a lot of consequence assessment methods for 
practical use can provide only rough estimates of the magnitude of effects for incidents 
involving large LNG release on water.  
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3. Consequence assessment methods 
In almost all of the studies on consequence modeling of LNG spill hazards, it is assumed 
that the reference LNGCs have membrane tanks. Qiao et al. investigated the influence of the 
geometric difference between membrane and Moss spherical tanks on the LNG release rate 
from a hole, but they did not carry out consequence analyses under the condition that LNG 
was released from a Moss spherical tank (Qiao et al., 2006). Hence, a membrane type LNGC 
is adopted as a reference vessel in accordance with the majority of studies. For the purpose 
of consequence assessment modeling, the geometry of a membrane tank is much simplified 
to a rectangular box, as shown in Fig. 2. Though an LNGC has a complete double hull in 
reality, a single hull structure is assumed on the side of the reference LNGC. The reason of 
this assumption will be described later. 
The consequence analyses of LNG spill hazards are conducted in the following steps: 
1. Calculate the LNG release rate from a non-pressurized tank with a single hole, 
2. Calculate the diameter of the volatile liquid pool spreading on water, 
3. In the scenario of immediate ignition, calculate the size of a pool fire and distances to 
specified radiative flux levels of concern. Otherwise, skip to the next step, 
4. In the case of delayed or remote ignition, calculate downwind dispersion distances to 
specified concentration levels of concern. 
Consequence models in each step, which constitute a consequence assessment method, are 
described in the following subsections. 
 
3.1 LNG release from a cargo tank of a ship 
In the absence of appropriate models that account for the complex structure of an LNGC 
and the physics of release of cryogenic LNG, a simple orifice model is employed in the 
FERC method on the assumption of a single hull structure of an LNGC. In spite of the 
complete double hull structure in reality, the orifice model is widely used even in the recent 
literature on consequence assessment (Luketa-Hanlin, 2006). Since this model assumes 
release from a single hole on the side of a ship with single hull structure, LNG flows directly 
from a tank onto the seawater without any leakage into the space between hulls. 
The release rate from the tank to the seawater is expressed as a function of height through 
invoking Bernoulli’s equation. Multiplied by a discharge coefficient, the mass flow rate is 
expressed as follows: 
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where M  is the mass flow rate, dC  is the discharge coefficient to take account of the 
resistance given by the hole, l  is the LNG density, R  is the effective radius of the hull 
breach, h  is the static head above the hull breach, g  is the acceleration due to gravity. 
Discharge coefficient dC  is often used to account for reduction below the theoretical exit 
velocity due to viscosity and secondary flow effects. In other words, it depends on the 
nozzle shape and the Reynolds number. In the case of an ideal frictionless discharge, it is 
reasonable that dC  is set to unity. In practice, however, a rough, irregular breach could occur 
in the wall of an LNG cargo tank, so that the friction would be expected to be larger than 
that in the case of a well-rounded, sharp-edged orifice. Thus, FERC recommended 0.65 as a 
reasonable estimate to account for the fact that friction retards the flow (FERC, 2004). 
 
The orifice model does not attempt to account for the multi-hull construction of LNGCs, and 
therefore may overestimate the rate at which LNG would escape through a hole. Hence, the 
results should be interpreted as a rough guide to the rate of release for a given hole size. 
 
  
Fig. 2. Schematic view of a cross-section of an LNGC with a hole breached on the side. The 
amount of LNG just above the waterline is released through the hole over the seawater (Oka 
& Ota, 2008). 
 
3.2 Spread of an unconfined, evaporating LNG pool on water 
LNG spilled on water forms a floating pool because its density is roughly half that of water. 
This pool will spread over unconfined water, and will vaporize simultaneously due to the 
high heat transfer from the water and/or other sources. The ABSG study (ABSG, 2004) 
recommended the use of Webber’s model (van den Bosch, 1997) since it has a sound 
theoretical basis and accounts for friction effects. This model is based on self-similar 
solutions of the shallow water equations and lubrication theory. In this formulation, 
resistance by turbulent or laminar friction effects is included in the pool spread equation as 
follows: 
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where r  is the pool radius, t  is the time,   is the mean depth of the LNG pool,   is the 
dimensionless shape factor that describes the pool thickness profile, and FC  is the turbulent 
or viscous resistance term. The reduced acceleration due to gravity rg  is defined as follows: 
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where w  is the seawater density. In order to close Eq. (2), Webber also provided theoretical 
and empirical models to determine  ,   and FC  (van den Bosch, 1997). 
Next, film boiling effects on the above spreading model is briefly described. As an LNG pool 
spreads on a water surface, the heat transferred from the water and other sources will cause 
the liquid to vaporize. In the vapor dispersion scenario, vaporization is mainly controlled by 
heat transfer from the water to the LNG pool. The FERC recommended a film boiling heat 
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3. Consequence assessment methods 
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3.2 Spread of an unconfined, evaporating LNG pool on water 
LNG spilled on water forms a floating pool because its density is roughly half that of water. 
This pool will spread over unconfined water, and will vaporize simultaneously due to the 
high heat transfer from the water and/or other sources. The ABSG study (ABSG, 2004) 
recommended the use of Webber’s model (van den Bosch, 1997) since it has a sound 
theoretical basis and accounts for friction effects. This model is based on self-similar 
solutions of the shallow water equations and lubrication theory. In this formulation, 
resistance by turbulent or laminar friction effects is included in the pool spread equation as 
follows: 
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where r  is the pool radius, t  is the time,   is the mean depth of the LNG pool,   is the 
dimensionless shape factor that describes the pool thickness profile, and FC  is the turbulent 
or viscous resistance term. The reduced acceleration due to gravity rg  is defined as follows: 
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where w  is the seawater density. In order to close Eq. (2), Webber also provided theoretical 
and empirical models to determine  ,   and FC  (van den Bosch, 1997). 
Next, film boiling effects on the above spreading model is briefly described. As an LNG pool 
spreads on a water surface, the heat transferred from the water and other sources will cause 
the liquid to vaporize. In the vapor dispersion scenario, vaporization is mainly controlled by 
heat transfer from the water to the LNG pool. The FERC recommended a film boiling heat 
www.intechopen.com
Natural Gas556
 
flux of 85 [kW/m²] as a reasonable value, which was obtained in the Burro series tests 
(Koopman et al., 1982). In the pool fire scenario, vaporization is controlled by heat transfer 
from both water and fire to the LNG pool. The FERC recommended a mass burning rate per 
unit area bm  as 0.282 [kg/m2/s]. The film boiling and mass burning rates per unit area of the 
LNG pool are regarded as constant, but the total mass removal rate is dynamically linked to 
the spreading rate through the pool area. 
In the present spread model of an evaporating pool, the physical effects of winds, waves, 
and currents are not taken into consideration. Several attempts to quantify some of these 
effects have been made in a few studies (Cornwell & Johnson, 2004; Spaulding et al., 2007), 
but it is difficult to validate them due to the lack of experimental data. On the other hand, 
Fay recently showed that the effects of ocean wave interaction on the spread of an 
evaporating LNG pool were only small or negligible in his classical and newly proposed 
models (Fay, 2007). 
 
3.3 Thermal radiation from pool fires on water 
LNG is known as a clean burning fuel, but significant smoke production is expected for 
large LNG pool fires (Luketa-Hanlin, 2006). This will tend to obscure the flame and reduce 
the thermal radiation emitted from the fire. Therefore, the FERC recommends the use of the 
two-zone solid flame model (Rew & Hulbert, 1996) for assessing the thermal hazards from 
pool fires. This model assumes that the flame is divided into lower and upper zones. Smoke 
does not obscure the flame in the lower zone, while it obscures the flame and reduces the 
amount of thermal radiation emitted from the upper zone. To determine the flame 
geometry, this model assumes that the flame is a solid, gray emitter having a regular well-
defined shape such as an upright or tilted cylinder. The radiative heat flux upon an object 
can be determined by 
 
,q EF  (4) 
 
where   is the atmospheric transmissivity, E  is the surface emissive power, and F  is the 
geometric view factor between the target and the cylindrical flame. The view factor F  is 
determined from the dimension of flame area, which is characterized by the flame base 
diameter, visible flame height, and flame tilt. The flame base is equivalent to the pool size 
calculated by the pool spread model. 
The flame height depends on the flame base diameter and the burning rate, and their 
correlation was developed by Thomas (Beyler, 2002) as follows: 
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where H  is the mean visible height of turbulent diffusion flames, D  is the effective diameter 
of a pool, a  is the ambient air density. The FERC method takes the effect of winds into 
consideration, so that the nondimensional wind speed u  is determined by 
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where wu  is the wind speed measured at a height of 1.6 m, and v  is the vapor density. 
However, u  is assigned a value of unity if it is less than 1.  
 
3.4 Vapor dispersion of LNG spills on water 
When considering large release of LNG, dense-gas effects are important and must be taken 
into consideration in a dispersion model used for analysis. In the FERC method, the 
DEGADIS model (Spicer & Havens, 1987) was recommended for use in estimating the 
distances that flammable vapor might reach. DEGADIS accounts for dense-gas effects and 
was originally developed for the simulation of cryogenic flammable gas dispersion, 
particularly for LNG. The DEGADIS model are widely used in the public and private 
sectors due to the convenience of fast computational run time and ease of use. It has been 
validated against a wide range of laboratory and field test data. Furthermore, the federal 
siting requirements for onshore LNG facilities (CFR, 1980) specify the use of DEGADIS for 
the determination of dispersion distances.  
DEGADIS is one of one-dimensional integral models which use similarity profiles that 
assume a specific shape for the crosswind profile of concentration and other properties. The 
similarity forms represent the plume as being composed of a horizontally homogeneous 
section with Gaussian concentration profile edges as follows: 
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(7) 
 
where c  is the concentration, cc  is the centerline, ground-level concentration, b  is the half 
width of a horizontally homogeneous central section of gas plume, and yS  and zS  are the 
horizontal and vertical concentration scaling parameters, respectively. The downwind 
variations of spatially averaged, crosswind values are determined by using the conservation 
equations only in the downwind direction of x . Wind velocity xu  is assumed to be based 
on a power law profile as follows: 
 
0
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where 0u is the wind speed measured at 0z z , and 0z  is the reference height in wind velocity profile specification. The power coefficient   in Eqs. (7) and (8) is a function of 
atmospheric stability and surface roughness. In DEGADIS, it is determined by a weighted 
least-squares fit of the logarithmic profile of wind speed. 
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flux of 85 [kW/m²] as a reasonable value, which was obtained in the Burro series tests 
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unit area bm  as 0.282 [kg/m2/s]. The film boiling and mass burning rates per unit area of the 
LNG pool are regarded as constant, but the total mass removal rate is dynamically linked to 
the spreading rate through the pool area. 
In the present spread model of an evaporating pool, the physical effects of winds, waves, 
and currents are not taken into consideration. Several attempts to quantify some of these 
effects have been made in a few studies (Cornwell & Johnson, 2004; Spaulding et al., 2007), 
but it is difficult to validate them due to the lack of experimental data. On the other hand, 
Fay recently showed that the effects of ocean wave interaction on the spread of an 
evaporating LNG pool were only small or negligible in his classical and newly proposed 
models (Fay, 2007). 
 
3.3 Thermal radiation from pool fires on water 
LNG is known as a clean burning fuel, but significant smoke production is expected for 
large LNG pool fires (Luketa-Hanlin, 2006). This will tend to obscure the flame and reduce 
the thermal radiation emitted from the fire. Therefore, the FERC recommends the use of the 
two-zone solid flame model (Rew & Hulbert, 1996) for assessing the thermal hazards from 
pool fires. This model assumes that the flame is divided into lower and upper zones. Smoke 
does not obscure the flame in the lower zone, while it obscures the flame and reduces the 
amount of thermal radiation emitted from the upper zone. To determine the flame 
geometry, this model assumes that the flame is a solid, gray emitter having a regular well-
defined shape such as an upright or tilted cylinder. The radiative heat flux upon an object 
can be determined by 
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where   is the atmospheric transmissivity, E  is the surface emissive power, and F  is the 
geometric view factor between the target and the cylindrical flame. The view factor F  is 
determined from the dimension of flame area, which is characterized by the flame base 
diameter, visible flame height, and flame tilt. The flame base is equivalent to the pool size 
calculated by the pool spread model. 
The flame height depends on the flame base diameter and the burning rate, and their 
correlation was developed by Thomas (Beyler, 2002) as follows: 
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where H  is the mean visible height of turbulent diffusion flames, D  is the effective diameter 
of a pool, a  is the ambient air density. The FERC method takes the effect of winds into 
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where wu  is the wind speed measured at a height of 1.6 m, and v  is the vapor density. 
However, u  is assigned a value of unity if it is less than 1.  
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DEGADIS model (Spicer & Havens, 1987) was recommended for use in estimating the 
distances that flammable vapor might reach. DEGADIS accounts for dense-gas effects and 
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particularly for LNG. The DEGADIS model are widely used in the public and private 
sectors due to the convenience of fast computational run time and ease of use. It has been 
validated against a wide range of laboratory and field test data. Furthermore, the federal 
siting requirements for onshore LNG facilities (CFR, 1980) specify the use of DEGADIS for 
the determination of dispersion distances.  
DEGADIS is one of one-dimensional integral models which use similarity profiles that 
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similarity forms represent the plume as being composed of a horizontally homogeneous 
section with Gaussian concentration profile edges as follows: 
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where c  is the concentration, cc  is the centerline, ground-level concentration, b  is the half 
width of a horizontally homogeneous central section of gas plume, and yS  and zS  are the 
horizontal and vertical concentration scaling parameters, respectively. The downwind 
variations of spatially averaged, crosswind values are determined by using the conservation 
equations only in the downwind direction of x . Wind velocity xu  is assumed to be based 
on a power law profile as follows: 
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where 0u is the wind speed measured at 0z z , and 0z  is the reference height in wind velocity profile specification. The power coefficient   in Eqs. (7) and (8) is a function of 
atmospheric stability and surface roughness. In DEGADIS, it is determined by a weighted 
least-squares fit of the logarithmic profile of wind speed. 
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Transient denser-than-air gas release cannot be represented as steady, continuous release, so 
that the spill is modelled as a series of pseudo-steady-state release in DEGADIS. It should be 
noted that the application of DEGADIS is limited to the description of atmospheric 
dispersion of denser-than-air gas release at ground level onto flat, unobstructed terrain or 
water. In other words, the weakness is that it cannot model the flow around obstacles or 
over complex terrain. 
 
3.5 Summary of Consequence assessment methods 
The consequence models for LNG release from a tank, volatile pool spread, thermal 
radiation from a pool fire, and denser-than-air gas dispersion have been briefly described in 
the previous subsections. These constitutive submodels in the FERC method are 
summarized in Table 1. In the pool spread process, its shape is assumed to be semi-circular 
because of the existence of a ship (Fay, 2003; FERC, 2004). The vaporization due to heat 
transfer from the fire and/or the water to the pool is taken into consideration, but 
environmental effects of waves, currents and winds are not incorporated into the spread 
model. 
In general, since many of constitutive submodels for practical use, such as those in the FERC 
method, have limitations that can cause greater uncertainty in calculating release, spread, 
and subsequent hazards, these methods can provide only rough estimates of the magnitude 
of effects for incidents involving large LNG releases on water. The more detailed models 
based on computational fluid dynamics (CFD) techniques can be applied to improve 
analysis of site-specific hazards and consequences in higher hazard zones. In the vapor 
dispersion process, for example, it is important to appropriately represent the topography 
downwind of the release point so as to obtain precise estimates of effects in actual incident 
circumstances. However, CFD models have also their own limitations, and its further 
refinement is required to improve the degree of accuracy and reliability for consequence 
assessment modeling (Hightower et al., 2005). In addition, due to high computational costs, 
CFD models are not normally used for practical hazard assessment under the present 
circumstances. 
 
LNG 
RELEASE POOL SPREAD 
VAPORI-
ZATION POOL FIRE VAPOR DISPERSION 
Discharge 
coefficient 
Time 
evolution 
Friction 
effects 
included 
Vaporization 
rate 
[kg/m2/s] 
Flame 
model 
Surface 
emissive 
power 
[kW/m2] 
obstacles 
or terrain 
effects 
included 
Averaging 
time 
0.65 Unsteady Yes 
0.282 
(Pool fire) 
Two-
zone 
solid 
cylinder 
that 
includes 
tilt for 
wind 
effects 
265 No 
Not more 
than a few 
seconds 
0.17 
(Dispersion) 
Table 1. Summary of principal features of the FERC method 
 
 
3.6 Consequence analysis conditions for LNG spill hazards 
Large-scale LNG spill hazard scenarios (Oka & Ota, 2008) are shown in Table 2. These 
assumptions were originally employed in the ABSG study (ABSG, 2004; FERC, 2004) for the 
conventional size LNGC except for the total spill volume and the breach size. In the ABSG 
study, only two holes of 1 and 5 m in diameter were chosen to provide calculation examples 
of pool fire and vapor dispersion scenarios. In the present study, sensitivity to the breach 
size is analyzed in the range from 0.5 to 15 m in diameter. Unlike the ABSG study, the spill 
volume is determined based on Fay's study (Fay, 2003). He simplified the geometry of a 
membrane tank to a rectangular box and estimated the volume of the spilled LNG as 
follows. If rd  is the fully-loaded draft, the initial height 0h  (see Fig. 2) of the upper surface of 
LNG above the waterline level is about 1.1 rd  for the conventional LNGC. The cargo surface 
area tA  is related to the cargo tank volume ctV  by the following equation, 
 
0.52 .ctt
r
VA d
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 For an LNGC of a 125,000 m3 cargo capacity, with an 11.8 m draft and a 25,000 m3 cargo 
tank volume, the initial height 0h  and the cargo surface area tA  are estimated to be 13 m and 
1,100 m2, respectively. Thus, the volume of the spilled LNG from the tank is given as 
0 th A =14,300 m3. Meanwhile, the height from the inner bottom plating to the load water line 
is easily derived from Eq. (9) as 0.82 rd , so that the depth of a double bottom is 0.18 rd   2.1 
m. This is a typical value for membrane type LNGCs. Therefore, Eq. (9) can be considered as 
a reasonable expression to easily estimate the typical dimensions of a membrane tank. 
Hence, the total spill volume for the latest LNGC is also determined in the same manner. 
 
Table 2. Release scenarios for an LNG spill from a tank of the conventional and latest 
LNGCs 
 
Weather conditions at the time of the release have a major influence on the extent of 
dispersion. Thus, environmental conditions for the above spill hazard scenarios are 
provided in Table 3. These conditions were also used in the ABSG study (ABSG, 2004; FERC, 
2004). In the vapor dispersion scenario, a wind speed of 2.0 m/s at 10 m above ground and 
an F stability class were used for an atmospheric stability condition. The F class is extremely 
stable and the atmospheric turbulence is very weak, so that it takes the greatest amount of 
LNG carrier Conventional Latest 
LNG properties:  
 LNG composition Methane 
 LNG density 422.5 kg/m3 
Release assumptions:  
 Total cargo capacity 125,000 m3 250,000 m3 
 Volume of a cargo tank 25,000 m3 50,000 m3 
 Total spill volume 14,300 m3 28,600 m3 
 Initial LNG height above breach 13 m 13.2 m 
 Breach size 0.5 to 15 m in diameter 
 Breach location Just above the waterline 
 Pool shape Semi-circle 
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Transient denser-than-air gas release cannot be represented as steady, continuous release, so 
that the spill is modelled as a series of pseudo-steady-state release in DEGADIS. It should be 
noted that the application of DEGADIS is limited to the description of atmospheric 
dispersion of denser-than-air gas release at ground level onto flat, unobstructed terrain or 
water. In other words, the weakness is that it cannot model the flow around obstacles or 
over complex terrain. 
 
3.5 Summary of Consequence assessment methods 
The consequence models for LNG release from a tank, volatile pool spread, thermal 
radiation from a pool fire, and denser-than-air gas dispersion have been briefly described in 
the previous subsections. These constitutive submodels in the FERC method are 
summarized in Table 1. In the pool spread process, its shape is assumed to be semi-circular 
because of the existence of a ship (Fay, 2003; FERC, 2004). The vaporization due to heat 
transfer from the fire and/or the water to the pool is taken into consideration, but 
environmental effects of waves, currents and winds are not incorporated into the spread 
model. 
In general, since many of constitutive submodels for practical use, such as those in the FERC 
method, have limitations that can cause greater uncertainty in calculating release, spread, 
and subsequent hazards, these methods can provide only rough estimates of the magnitude 
of effects for incidents involving large LNG releases on water. The more detailed models 
based on computational fluid dynamics (CFD) techniques can be applied to improve 
analysis of site-specific hazards and consequences in higher hazard zones. In the vapor 
dispersion process, for example, it is important to appropriately represent the topography 
downwind of the release point so as to obtain precise estimates of effects in actual incident 
circumstances. However, CFD models have also their own limitations, and its further 
refinement is required to improve the degree of accuracy and reliability for consequence 
assessment modeling (Hightower et al., 2005). In addition, due to high computational costs, 
CFD models are not normally used for practical hazard assessment under the present 
circumstances. 
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Large-scale LNG spill hazard scenarios (Oka & Ota, 2008) are shown in Table 2. These 
assumptions were originally employed in the ABSG study (ABSG, 2004; FERC, 2004) for the 
conventional size LNGC except for the total spill volume and the breach size. In the ABSG 
study, only two holes of 1 and 5 m in diameter were chosen to provide calculation examples 
of pool fire and vapor dispersion scenarios. In the present study, sensitivity to the breach 
size is analyzed in the range from 0.5 to 15 m in diameter. Unlike the ABSG study, the spill 
volume is determined based on Fay's study (Fay, 2003). He simplified the geometry of a 
membrane tank to a rectangular box and estimated the volume of the spilled LNG as 
follows. If rd  is the fully-loaded draft, the initial height 0h  (see Fig. 2) of the upper surface of 
LNG above the waterline level is about 1.1 rd  for the conventional LNGC. The cargo surface 
area tA  is related to the cargo tank volume ctV  by the following equation, 
 
0.52 .ctt
r
VA d
 (9) 
 
 For an LNGC of a 125,000 m3 cargo capacity, with an 11.8 m draft and a 25,000 m3 cargo 
tank volume, the initial height 0h  and the cargo surface area tA  are estimated to be 13 m and 
1,100 m2, respectively. Thus, the volume of the spilled LNG from the tank is given as 
0 th A =14,300 m3. Meanwhile, the height from the inner bottom plating to the load water line 
is easily derived from Eq. (9) as 0.82 rd , so that the depth of a double bottom is 0.18 rd   2.1 
m. This is a typical value for membrane type LNGCs. Therefore, Eq. (9) can be considered as 
a reasonable expression to easily estimate the typical dimensions of a membrane tank. 
Hence, the total spill volume for the latest LNGC is also determined in the same manner. 
 
Table 2. Release scenarios for an LNG spill from a tank of the conventional and latest 
LNGCs 
 
Weather conditions at the time of the release have a major influence on the extent of 
dispersion. Thus, environmental conditions for the above spill hazard scenarios are 
provided in Table 3. These conditions were also used in the ABSG study (ABSG, 2004; FERC, 
2004). In the vapor dispersion scenario, a wind speed of 2.0 m/s at 10 m above ground and 
an F stability class were used for an atmospheric stability condition. The F class is extremely 
stable and the atmospheric turbulence is very weak, so that it takes the greatest amount of 
LNG carrier Conventional Latest 
LNG properties:  
 LNG composition Methane 
 LNG density 422.5 kg/m3 
Release assumptions:  
 Total cargo capacity 125,000 m3 250,000 m3 
 Volume of a cargo tank 25,000 m3 50,000 m3 
 Total spill volume 14,300 m3 28,600 m3 
 Initial LNG height above breach 13 m 13.2 m 
 Breach size 0.5 to 15 m in diameter 
 Breach location Just above the waterline 
 Pool shape Semi-circle 
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time for the released gases to mix with the atmosphere. In other words, such low wind 
speed and stable atmospheric condition result in the greatest downwind distance to the LFL. 
In general, for a lot of one-dimensional integral models, topography is characterized by the 
surface roughness value. Since the surface roughness accounts for the effects of terrain on 
the vapor dispersion, a rougher surface will tend to cause more mixing with ambient air, 
which results in more rapid dispersion of a vapor cloud. As for the averaging time of gas 
concentration, the FERC method recommended that a short averaging time (not more than a 
few seconds) be used because a flammable cloud need only be within the flammable range 
for a very short time to be ignited. In the ABSG scenario (ABSG, 2004; FERC, 2004), its 
averaging time was set to 0 second, that is, a peak concentration was used. 
 
Hazards Pool fire Vapor dispersion 
 Air temperature 300 K 295 K 
 Water temperature 294 K 294 K 
 Relative humidity 70 % 50 % 
 Wind speed 8.9 m/s 2.0 m/s 
Pasquill stability class - F 
Surface roughness - 0.01 m 
Table 3. Environmental conditions for the scenarios of pool fire and vapor dispersion 
hazards 
 
4. Results and discussion 
This work considers thermal radiation and flammable vapor hazards caused by unconfined 
LNG spills on water resulting from an LNG cargo release. The recommended FERC method 
is used to analyze the sensitivity of the LNG hazard consequences to the breach diameter in 
the following subsections. Based on the physical models and numerical algorithms of the 
FERC method, a computer program written in the Fortran 90 programming language was 
developed, except for the vapor dispersion model. The results calculated using this program 
was carefully checked against those of consequence assessment examples in the ABSG study 
(FERC, 2004) to verify and validate the program. Unlike this study, the computations 
presented in the ABSG study were performed with the assistance of the Mathcad computer 
software. 
 
4.1 LNG release process 
Figures 3 and 4 show the influence of the breach diameter on the time taken to empty a tank 
above the waterline level and the time to vaporize all of the LNG released on water under 
the pool fire scenario and under the vapor dispersion scenario, respectively. In other words, 
the former time corresponds to total spill duration in both scenarios. The latter can be 
referred to as total fire duration in the pool fire scenario and as total evaporation duration in 
the vapor dispersion scenario. 
The orifice model is used to calculate LNG release rate from a tank. Integrating Eq. (1) with 
the initial condition, 0h h  at 0t  , one can easily obtain the analytical expression of the spill 
duration st  as follows: 
 
 
0 232 ,ts
d
h At dg C 
  (10) 
 
where d  is the hole diameter, and 0h  and tA  depend on the size and capacity of an LNGC. 
Hence, as shown in Figs. 3 and 4, the total spill duration is depicted as a linear function of 
the breach diameter with a slope of -2 on a double logarithmic graph. On the other hand, the 
total duration of fire and that of evaporation can be obtained as a solution of the pool spread 
model. As for the total fire duration, it is equal to the total spill duration when the breach 
diameters are less than 2 and 3 m in Figs. 3(a) and 3(b), respectively. With the increase in the 
breach diameter, however, the curve representing the fire duration begins to deviate from 
the straight line representing the spill duration. The total spill duration is much shorter than 
the total fire duration when the breach diameters are larger than about 5 and 6 m for the 
conventional and latest LNGCs, respectively. 
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Fig. 3. Effect of breach diameter on the total duration of spill and that of fire under the pool 
fire scenario: (a) the conventional LNGC; (b) the latest LNGC. 
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time for the released gases to mix with the atmosphere. In other words, such low wind 
speed and stable atmospheric condition result in the greatest downwind distance to the LFL. 
In general, for a lot of one-dimensional integral models, topography is characterized by the 
surface roughness value. Since the surface roughness accounts for the effects of terrain on 
the vapor dispersion, a rougher surface will tend to cause more mixing with ambient air, 
which results in more rapid dispersion of a vapor cloud. As for the averaging time of gas 
concentration, the FERC method recommended that a short averaging time (not more than a 
few seconds) be used because a flammable cloud need only be within the flammable range 
for a very short time to be ignited. In the ABSG scenario (ABSG, 2004; FERC, 2004), its 
averaging time was set to 0 second, that is, a peak concentration was used. 
 
Hazards Pool fire Vapor dispersion 
 Air temperature 300 K 295 K 
 Water temperature 294 K 294 K 
 Relative humidity 70 % 50 % 
 Wind speed 8.9 m/s 2.0 m/s 
Pasquill stability class - F 
Surface roughness - 0.01 m 
Table 3. Environmental conditions for the scenarios of pool fire and vapor dispersion 
hazards 
 
4. Results and discussion 
This work considers thermal radiation and flammable vapor hazards caused by unconfined 
LNG spills on water resulting from an LNG cargo release. The recommended FERC method 
is used to analyze the sensitivity of the LNG hazard consequences to the breach diameter in 
the following subsections. Based on the physical models and numerical algorithms of the 
FERC method, a computer program written in the Fortran 90 programming language was 
developed, except for the vapor dispersion model. The results calculated using this program 
was carefully checked against those of consequence assessment examples in the ABSG study 
(FERC, 2004) to verify and validate the program. Unlike this study, the computations 
presented in the ABSG study were performed with the assistance of the Mathcad computer 
software. 
 
4.1 LNG release process 
Figures 3 and 4 show the influence of the breach diameter on the time taken to empty a tank 
above the waterline level and the time to vaporize all of the LNG released on water under 
the pool fire scenario and under the vapor dispersion scenario, respectively. In other words, 
the former time corresponds to total spill duration in both scenarios. The latter can be 
referred to as total fire duration in the pool fire scenario and as total evaporation duration in 
the vapor dispersion scenario. 
The orifice model is used to calculate LNG release rate from a tank. Integrating Eq. (1) with 
the initial condition, 0h h  at 0t  , one can easily obtain the analytical expression of the spill 
duration st  as follows: 
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where d  is the hole diameter, and 0h  and tA  depend on the size and capacity of an LNGC. 
Hence, as shown in Figs. 3 and 4, the total spill duration is depicted as a linear function of 
the breach diameter with a slope of -2 on a double logarithmic graph. On the other hand, the 
total duration of fire and that of evaporation can be obtained as a solution of the pool spread 
model. As for the total fire duration, it is equal to the total spill duration when the breach 
diameters are less than 2 and 3 m in Figs. 3(a) and 3(b), respectively. With the increase in the 
breach diameter, however, the curve representing the fire duration begins to deviate from 
the straight line representing the spill duration. The total spill duration is much shorter than 
the total fire duration when the breach diameters are larger than about 5 and 6 m for the 
conventional and latest LNGCs, respectively. 
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Fig. 3. Effect of breach diameter on the total duration of spill and that of fire under the pool 
fire scenario: (a) the conventional LNGC; (b) the latest LNGC. 
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From these findings, an LNG spill can be characterized as either a long duration release or a 
large-scale release of short duration, depending upon the breach diameter. In general, the 
former is referred to as a continuous spill, and the latter as an instantaneous spill. The 
instantaneous spill in the literal sense is unlikely to occur, and represents an ideal limiting 
case. In reality, it represents a large-scale spill for a short time. Under the present pool fire 
scenario, a release can be classified into the instantaneous spill type when the breach 
diameters are greater than about 5 and 6 m for the conventional and latest LNGCs, 
respectively. In the same manner, when the breach diameters are less than 2 and 3 m, 
respectively, it can be classified into the continuous spill type. Any release from a breach 
whose diameter lies between these two ranges is considered to be in transition from the 
continuous spill type to the instantaneous spill type. 
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Fig. 4. Effect of breach diameter on the total duration of spill and that of evaporation under 
the vapor dispersion scenario: (a) the conventional size LNGC; (b) the latest LNGC. 
 
 
On the Whole, the above discussion holds true for the total evaporation duration under the 
vapor dispersion scenario in Fig. 4. Unlike in Fig. 3, however, the curve representing the 
evaporation duration is markedly out of alignment in the transitional range between the 
continuous and instantaneous spill types. This is attributed to the difference of the 
vaporization rates of an LNG pool, i.e., the difference between the film boiling rate and the 
mass burning rate. The pool spread model recommended in the FERC method is based on 
an integral approach that can avoid the need to characterize a spill type as either 
instantaneous or continuous. However, the lack of smoothness of these duration data 
suggests that it is necessary to improve the pool spread model in view of the transitional 
spill type range. 
 
4.2 Pool spread process 
Figures 5(a) and 5(b) show the sensitivity of the maximum pool radius to the breach size 
under the pool fire and vapor dispersion scenarios, respectively. In both scenarios the LNG 
pool radius increases with the increase in the breach diameter. Then, it reaches an 
asymptotic value when the breach diameters are greater than about 5 and 6 m for the 
conventional and latest LNGCs, respectively. 
In the pool fire scenario, it can be seen from Figs. 3 and 5(a) that the maximum pool size is 
independent of the hole size in the instantaneous spill range. The asymptotic value for the 
latest LNGC is approximately 430 m, and is about 30 % longer than that for the conventional 
size. On the other hand, the maximum pool radius increases almost linearly in the 
continuous spill range. In particular, when the breach diameter is less than about 2 m, there 
is no significant difference of the maximum pool radius between the conventional and latest 
LNGCs. In this hole diameter range, the maximum pool radius can be approximately 
estimated on the assumption that the vaporization rate matches the release rate from a tank 
for most of the total spill duration. 
The above discussion holds true for the results in the vapor dispersion scenario, except for 
the asymptotic value of a maximum pool radius. As shown in Fig. 5(b), it is approximately 
480 m for the latest LNGC, and is longer than that in the case of the pool fire scenario 
because the vaporization rate is lower than the mass burning rate. Similarly to the pool fire 
case, the asymptotic value of the maximum pool radius for the latest type LNGC increases 
by 30 % as compared to the conventional type, whereas the spill volume doubles. The 
reason for this is as follows: The LNG release rates calculated by the orifice model are 
proportional to h  as shown in Eq. (1) and the initial height 0h  has almost the same value 
for the two size LNGCs, so that the release rates from the latest type LNGC are almost equal 
to those from the conventional type at the initial stage of a spill. Therefore, the maximum 
pool radius does not expand significantly even if the cargo capacity becomes twice as large 
(Oka & Ota, 2008). 
In the present pool spread model, it is assumed that a single, semi-circular pool can be 
formed on water. In fact, however, the shape and size of the pool could be affected by 
environmental conditions, such as wind, waves and currents. Therefore, it may be more 
likely that the waves would break up a single pool into multiple irregular-shaped pools. 
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asymptotic value when the breach diameters are greater than about 5 and 6 m for the 
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latest LNGC is approximately 430 m, and is about 30 % longer than that for the conventional 
size. On the other hand, the maximum pool radius increases almost linearly in the 
continuous spill range. In particular, when the breach diameter is less than about 2 m, there 
is no significant difference of the maximum pool radius between the conventional and latest 
LNGCs. In this hole diameter range, the maximum pool radius can be approximately 
estimated on the assumption that the vaporization rate matches the release rate from a tank 
for most of the total spill duration. 
The above discussion holds true for the results in the vapor dispersion scenario, except for 
the asymptotic value of a maximum pool radius. As shown in Fig. 5(b), it is approximately 
480 m for the latest LNGC, and is longer than that in the case of the pool fire scenario 
because the vaporization rate is lower than the mass burning rate. Similarly to the pool fire 
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proportional to h  as shown in Eq. (1) and the initial height 0h  has almost the same value 
for the two size LNGCs, so that the release rates from the latest type LNGC are almost equal 
to those from the conventional type at the initial stage of a spill. Therefore, the maximum 
pool radius does not expand significantly even if the cargo capacity becomes twice as large 
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In the present pool spread model, it is assumed that a single, semi-circular pool can be 
formed on water. In fact, however, the shape and size of the pool could be affected by 
environmental conditions, such as wind, waves and currents. Therefore, it may be more 
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Fig. 5. Sensitivity of the maximum pool radius to the breach diameter under (a) the pool fire 
scenario and (b) the vapor dispersion scenario. The results for the conventional and latest 
LNGCs are compared in each scenario. 
 
4.3 Pool fire process 
For the conventional size LNGC, the sensitivity of the thermal radiation hazard distance to 
the breach diameter has already been investigated (Oka & Ota, 2008), but not for the latest 
one. Thus, the distances to 5 kW/m2 are compared in Fig. 6 as a function of the hole 
diameter. 
This intensity level is specified as a level of concern by the United States Federal Safety 
Standards for Liquefied Natural Gas Facilities (CFR, 1980). According to the Federal Safety 
Standards, the heat flux of 5 kW/m2 is an acceptable level of concern for direct exposure of 
human beings. For bare skin exposure, a heat flux at this intensity level will result in 
unbearable pain after an exposure of 13 seconds and second degree burns after an exposure 
of 40 seconds (Mudan, 1984). In general, the intensity level of 5 kW/m2 is used as a criterion 
for injury in a thermal radiation hazard assessment. 
 
The downwind distance profiles shown in Fig. 6 are each calculated based on the maximum 
pool radii for its corresponding LNGC size, so that they give profiles similar to those of the 
LNG pool radii shown in Fig. 5(a). In the cases where breaches are less than 2 m in diameter, 
there is not much difference in the downwind distance between the two LNGC sizes, 
though the total volume spilled from the latest LNGC is twice that from the conventional 
size. The reason for this is that the LNG released from the tank is in the continuous spill 
range. When the breach diameters are greater than approximately 5 and 6 m for the 
conventional and latest LNGCs, respectively, the effect of the breach diameter on the 
thermal hazard distance is negligible. The asymptotic value of the downwind distance to 
5 kW/m2 extends approximately from 1,600 m up to 2,000 m due to the enlarged capacity of 
the latest LNGC. Consequently, while the spill volume doubles, the maximum thermal 
hazard distance for the latest LNGC increases by only 25 % than that for the conventional 
size because of the same reason as discussed in the previous section on the pool spread 
process.  
The present study assumes that a single, coherent pool fire can be maintained for a very 
large pool diameter. However, this assumption may not be appropriate due to the inability 
of air to reach the interior of a fire and maintain combustion over such a large LNG pool 
(Luketa-Hanlin, 2006). Instead, the flame envelope would break up into several smaller, 
shorter flames at some very large size due to the environmental conditions, such as wind, 
waves and currents. The SNL study (Hightower et al., 2004) noted that these factors could 
reduce the thermal hazard distance by a factor of two to three. However, it is not yet known 
how to determine the limiting breakup diameter for a given LNG pool fire on water. The 
pool diameters presented here are speculative because experiments for large pool fires have 
never been performed (Luketa-Hanlin, 2006; Raj, 2007). Therefore, due to the assumption of 
a single, coherent pool fire, the hazard distances obtained in the present analyses should 
rather be considered as conservative estimates. 
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scenario and (b) the vapor dispersion scenario. The results for the conventional and latest 
LNGCs are compared in each scenario. 
 
4.3 Pool fire process 
For the conventional size LNGC, the sensitivity of the thermal radiation hazard distance to 
the breach diameter has already been investigated (Oka & Ota, 2008), but not for the latest 
one. Thus, the distances to 5 kW/m2 are compared in Fig. 6 as a function of the hole 
diameter. 
This intensity level is specified as a level of concern by the United States Federal Safety 
Standards for Liquefied Natural Gas Facilities (CFR, 1980). According to the Federal Safety 
Standards, the heat flux of 5 kW/m2 is an acceptable level of concern for direct exposure of 
human beings. For bare skin exposure, a heat flux at this intensity level will result in 
unbearable pain after an exposure of 13 seconds and second degree burns after an exposure 
of 40 seconds (Mudan, 1984). In general, the intensity level of 5 kW/m2 is used as a criterion 
for injury in a thermal radiation hazard assessment. 
 
The downwind distance profiles shown in Fig. 6 are each calculated based on the maximum 
pool radii for its corresponding LNGC size, so that they give profiles similar to those of the 
LNG pool radii shown in Fig. 5(a). In the cases where breaches are less than 2 m in diameter, 
there is not much difference in the downwind distance between the two LNGC sizes, 
though the total volume spilled from the latest LNGC is twice that from the conventional 
size. The reason for this is that the LNG released from the tank is in the continuous spill 
range. When the breach diameters are greater than approximately 5 and 6 m for the 
conventional and latest LNGCs, respectively, the effect of the breach diameter on the 
thermal hazard distance is negligible. The asymptotic value of the downwind distance to 
5 kW/m2 extends approximately from 1,600 m up to 2,000 m due to the enlarged capacity of 
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size because of the same reason as discussed in the previous section on the pool spread 
process.  
The present study assumes that a single, coherent pool fire can be maintained for a very 
large pool diameter. However, this assumption may not be appropriate due to the inability 
of air to reach the interior of a fire and maintain combustion over such a large LNG pool 
(Luketa-Hanlin, 2006). Instead, the flame envelope would break up into several smaller, 
shorter flames at some very large size due to the environmental conditions, such as wind, 
waves and currents. The SNL study (Hightower et al., 2004) noted that these factors could 
reduce the thermal hazard distance by a factor of two to three. However, it is not yet known 
how to determine the limiting breakup diameter for a given LNG pool fire on water. The 
pool diameters presented here are speculative because experiments for large pool fires have 
never been performed (Luketa-Hanlin, 2006; Raj, 2007). Therefore, due to the assumption of 
a single, coherent pool fire, the hazard distances obtained in the present analyses should 
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4.4 Vapor cloud dispersion process 
For flammable vapor dispersion distance calculation, the level of concern is generally taken 
as the LFL for the substance in the case of a flash fire. In addition, the level of concern is 
often defined as half the LFL to account for the localized pockets of higher gas 
concentrations that may occur in an actual release. The use of half the LFL for LNG is also 
supported by the Federal Safety Standards (CFR, 1980), which specifies the use of an 
average gas concentration in air of 2.5 % for onshore exclusion zones. For the present 
calculations, hazard distances are provided for the LFL. 
Figure 7 shows the effect of the hole diameter on the maximum distance to the LFL. The 
dispersion calculations were conducted under atmospheric stability class F as the worst-case 
scenario. Similarly to the calculation of the pool radius and the thermal hazard distance, 
profiles of the distance to reach the LFL are given as a function of the hole diameter, and it 
reaches an asymptotic value with the increase in the breach diameter. However, unlike the 
pool spread and pool fire processes, the vapor dispersion distance approaches 
asymptotically to an averagely constant level when the breach diameters are greater than 
about 3 and 4 m for the conventional and latest LNGCs, respectively. This inconsistency is 
attributed to the total evaporation duration which is singularly longer in the transitional 
spill range, as shown in Fig. 4. The asymptotic value of the distance to the LFL for the latest 
LNGC is only about 30 % longer than that for the conventional size, while the total spill 
volume from the latest LNGC is twice as much. This reason is the same as elaborated in the 
pool spread process. 
From the above discussion, it has been found that the evolution of an LNG vapor cloud is 
strongly influenced by the characteristics of the LNG pool spread process, i.e., the source 
conditions. This fact is consistent with the dispersion behavior of denser-than-air gas 
observed in field experiments (Blackmore et al., 1982). Therefore, it is necessary to improve 
the present pool spread model so as to provide more accurate source conditions for vapor 
dispersion calculation. 
As mentioned earlier in the first section, Qiao et al. investigated the sensitivity of vapor 
dispersion consequences to the breach diameter for the conventional size LNGC using the 
FERC method (Qiao et al., 2006). In their study, the averaging time to estimate flammable 
gas concentrations was set to 1 minute, though the use of a much shorter period of time was 
recommended in the FERC method (see Table 1). In the vapor dispersion scenarios of the 
ABSG study (ABSG, 2004; FERC, 2004), the averaging time was set to 0 second, so that the 
same averaging time is also used in this study. Qiao et al. employed completely the same 
scenarios as those in the ABSG study, which provided results of two example dispersion 
calculations (FERC, 2004). The downwind distances to the LFL shown in the ABSG study 
were about 3,400 and 4,100 m for 1 m and 5 m hole diameters, respectively, whereas the 
corresponding results by Qiao et al. were about 3,400 and 3,300 m. Their results are in 
contradiction to the previous experimental observation that the higher the vaporization rate 
is, the greater the distance to the LFL becomes. In addition, they performed curve fitting for 
their calculated values without taking account of the results in the cases where the hole 
diameters were 1, 4 and 6 m. Nevertheless, they drew a questionable conclusion that the 
distance to the LFL approached asymptotically to an almost constant level when the breach 
diameter was greater than 5 m for the conventional size LNGC. 
Finally, the present results are briefly compared to those in the ABSG study (FERC, 2004). 
When the hole diameters are 1 and 5 m, the distances to the LFL in this study are about 3,340 
 
and 4,940 m for the conventional size LNGC, respectively. Since the LNG spill volume in the 
present calculation is greater than that in the ABSG study, both results are not compared 
quantitatively in a strict sense. In addition, for the purpose of conservative estimation, the 
maximum distances are determined by the LFL concentrations at the ground level, in 
contrast to a default height of 0.5 m to calculate the flammability contours in DEGADIS. In 
the case with 1 m hole diameter, however, almost the same results are obtained in both of 
the studies, because the release is in the continuous spill range. On the other hand, since the 
LNG release from a hole with a diameter of 5 m is classified into the instantaneous spill 
type, the dispersion distance in the present study is longer than that in the ABSG study due 
to the effects of the larger spill volume and the difference of the elevation level to measure 
the LFL concentration. 
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 Fig. 7. Sensitivity of the downwind distance to the LFL to the hole diameter of a single tank 
for the conventional and latest LNGCs. For comparison, results from the previous study 
(Qiao et al., 2006) are also shown in the figure. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
Consequence analyses of large-scale liquefied natural gas spills on water have been carried 
out using the method proposed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC, 
2004). The principal LNG hazards of interest for the present study are those posed by 
thermal radiation and flammable vapor dispersion following unconfined LNG spills on 
water. In particular, this study has focused on the sensitivity of the LNG release duration, of 
the volatile pool spread, and of the pool fire and vapor dispersion hazards to the size of a 
hole breached in a membrane-type tank of the conventional and latest LNGCs. From the 
practical viewpoint of applicability to any breach size, the use of the FERC models has been 
recommended as the most appropriate, practical method at the present time (Oka & Ota, 
2008; Oka, 2009). 
The present sensitivity analyses have shown that the consequences are strongly dependent 
upon the breach size in the ranges associated with the continuous and transitional spill 
types under the present release assumption. On the other hand, when the breach diameter is 
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4.4 Vapor cloud dispersion process 
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supported by the Federal Safety Standards (CFR, 1980), which specifies the use of an 
average gas concentration in air of 2.5 % for onshore exclusion zones. For the present 
calculations, hazard distances are provided for the LFL. 
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dispersion calculations were conducted under atmospheric stability class F as the worst-case 
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profiles of the distance to reach the LFL are given as a function of the hole diameter, and it 
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pool spread and pool fire processes, the vapor dispersion distance approaches 
asymptotically to an averagely constant level when the breach diameters are greater than 
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attributed to the total evaporation duration which is singularly longer in the transitional 
spill range, as shown in Fig. 4. The asymptotic value of the distance to the LFL for the latest 
LNGC is only about 30 % longer than that for the conventional size, while the total spill 
volume from the latest LNGC is twice as much. This reason is the same as elaborated in the 
pool spread process. 
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strongly influenced by the characteristics of the LNG pool spread process, i.e., the source 
conditions. This fact is consistent with the dispersion behavior of denser-than-air gas 
observed in field experiments (Blackmore et al., 1982). Therefore, it is necessary to improve 
the present pool spread model so as to provide more accurate source conditions for vapor 
dispersion calculation. 
As mentioned earlier in the first section, Qiao et al. investigated the sensitivity of vapor 
dispersion consequences to the breach diameter for the conventional size LNGC using the 
FERC method (Qiao et al., 2006). In their study, the averaging time to estimate flammable 
gas concentrations was set to 1 minute, though the use of a much shorter period of time was 
recommended in the FERC method (see Table 1). In the vapor dispersion scenarios of the 
ABSG study (ABSG, 2004; FERC, 2004), the averaging time was set to 0 second, so that the 
same averaging time is also used in this study. Qiao et al. employed completely the same 
scenarios as those in the ABSG study, which provided results of two example dispersion 
calculations (FERC, 2004). The downwind distances to the LFL shown in the ABSG study 
were about 3,400 and 4,100 m for 1 m and 5 m hole diameters, respectively, whereas the 
corresponding results by Qiao et al. were about 3,400 and 3,300 m. Their results are in 
contradiction to the previous experimental observation that the higher the vaporization rate 
is, the greater the distance to the LFL becomes. In addition, they performed curve fitting for 
their calculated values without taking account of the results in the cases where the hole 
diameters were 1, 4 and 6 m. Nevertheless, they drew a questionable conclusion that the 
distance to the LFL approached asymptotically to an almost constant level when the breach 
diameter was greater than 5 m for the conventional size LNGC. 
Finally, the present results are briefly compared to those in the ABSG study (FERC, 2004). 
When the hole diameters are 1 and 5 m, the distances to the LFL in this study are about 3,340 
 
and 4,940 m for the conventional size LNGC, respectively. Since the LNG spill volume in the 
present calculation is greater than that in the ABSG study, both results are not compared 
quantitatively in a strict sense. In addition, for the purpose of conservative estimation, the 
maximum distances are determined by the LFL concentrations at the ground level, in 
contrast to a default height of 0.5 m to calculate the flammability contours in DEGADIS. In 
the case with 1 m hole diameter, however, almost the same results are obtained in both of 
the studies, because the release is in the continuous spill range. On the other hand, since the 
LNG release from a hole with a diameter of 5 m is classified into the instantaneous spill 
type, the dispersion distance in the present study is longer than that in the ABSG study due 
to the effects of the larger spill volume and the difference of the elevation level to measure 
the LFL concentration. 
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the volatile pool spread, and of the pool fire and vapor dispersion hazards to the size of a 
hole breached in a membrane-type tank of the conventional and latest LNGCs. From the 
practical viewpoint of applicability to any breach size, the use of the FERC models has been 
recommended as the most appropriate, practical method at the present time (Oka & Ota, 
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The present sensitivity analyses have shown that the consequences are strongly dependent 
upon the breach size in the ranges associated with the continuous and transitional spill 
types under the present release assumption. On the other hand, when the breach diameter is 
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larger than a certain critical value, there is little influence on the consequences regardless of 
the scenarios of pool fire and vapor dispersion hazards. 
In the pool fire scenario, the critical values of the hole diameter are about 5 and 6 m for the 
conventional and latest LNGCs, respectively. In the vapor dispersion scenario, on the other 
hand, the critical diameters for the distance to the LFL are approximately 3 and 4 m for the 
two size LNGCs, respectively. This inconsistency is attributed to the singularly long 
evaporation duration of an LNG pool in the transitional spill range. These singular solutions 
obtained from the pool spread model indicate the lack of appropriate dynamic nature for 
transitional spills in the present integral approach. 
Therefore, it is important to develop a simple, but accurate pool spread model without 
dependence on spill types. On the other hand, it should be noted that practical consequence 
assessment methods can generally provide only rough estimates of the magnitude of effects 
for incidents involving large LNG release on water because of the variability in actual 
incident circumstances as well as the uncertainty inherent in the methods used. 
 
6. References 
ABSG (2004). Consequence Assessment Methods for Incidents Involving Releases from 
Liquefied Natural Gas Carriers, Contract report for the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, ABSG Consulting Inc., FERC04C40196, 
  http://www.ferc.gov/industries/lng/safety/reports/cons-model-comments.pdf 
Beyler, C. L. (2002). Fire Hazard Calculations for Large, Open Hydrocarbon Fires, In: The 
SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, Third Edition, Chapter 11, 3-268-3-314, 
National Fire Protection Association, ISBN: 0877654514, Massachusetts 
Blackmore, D. R.; Eyre, J. A. & Summers, G. G. (1982). Dispersion and Combustion Behavior of 
Gas Clouds Resulting from Large Spillages of LNG and LPG onto the Sea, Transactions 
of the Institute of Marine Engineers (TM) 94, Paper 29, 1-18 , ISSN: 0268-4152 
Brown, T. C.; Cederwall, R. T., & Chan, S. T., et al. (1990). Falcon Series Data Report: 1987 
LNG Vapor Barrier Verification Field Trials, Final Report, Gas Research Institute, 
GRI-89/0138 
CFR (1980). Code of Federal Regulations, Title 49: Transportation, Part 193 Liquefied 
Natural Gas Facilities: Federal Safety Standards. U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, DC 
Cornwell, J. B. & Johnson, D. W. (2004). Modeling LNG Spills on Water, AIChE 2004 Spring 
National Meeting, New Orleans, Louisiana, April 25-29, 2004 
EIA (2009). International Energy Outlook 2009, Energy Information Administration, Office of 
Integrated Analysis and Forecasting, U.S. Department of Energy, DOE/EIA-0484, 
Washington, DC 20585 
Fay, J. A. (2003). Model of Spills and Fires from LNG and Oil Tankers, Journal of Hazardous 
Materials, Vol. B96, 171-188, ISSN: 0304-3894 
Fay, J. A. (2007). Spread of Large LNG Pools on the Sea, Journal of Hazardous Materials, Vol. 
140, 541-551, ISSN: 0304-3894 
Feldbauer, G. F.; Heigl, J. J. & McQueen, W., et al. (1972). Spills of LNG on Water-
Vaporization and Downwind Drift of Combustible Mixtures, Report No. EE61E-72, 
Esso Research & Engineering Company 
 
FERC (2004). Staff's Responses to Comments on Consequence Assessment Methods for Incidents 
Involving Releases from Liquefied Natural Gas Carriers, Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, Docket No. AD04-6-000, 
 http://www.ferc.gov/industries/lng/safety/reports/cons-model-comments.pdf 
Hightower, M.; Gritzo, L. & Luketa-Hanlin, A., et al. (2004). Guidance on Risk Analysis and 
Safety Implications of a Large Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Spill Over Water, SANDIA 
REPORT, SAND2004-6258, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM 
Hightower, M.; Gritzo, L. & Luketa-Hanlin, A. (2005). Safety Implications of a Large LNG 
Tanker Spill Over Water, Process Safety Progress, Vol. 24, 168-174, ISSN: 1066-8527 
Koopman, R. P.; Cederwall, R. T. & Ermak, D. L., et al. (1982). Analysis of Burro Series 40-m3 
LNG Spill Experiments, Journal of Hazardous Materials, Vol. 6, No. 1-2, 43-83, ISSN: 
0304-3894 
Koopman, R. P. & Ermak, D. L. (2007). Lessons Learned from LNG Safety Research, Journal 
of Hazardous Materials, Vol. 140, Issue 3, 412-428, ISSN: 0304-3894 
Luketa-Hanlin, A. (2006). A Review of Large-Scale LNG Spills: Experiments and Modeling, 
Journal of Hazardous Materials, Vol. A132, 119-140, ISSN: 0304-3894 
Luketa, A.; Hightower, M. M. & Attaway, S. (2008). Breach and Safety Analysis of Spills 
Over Water from Large Liquefied Natural Gas Carriers, SANDIA REPORT, 
SAND2008-3153, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM 
Mizner, G. A. & Eyre, J. A. (1983). Radiation from Liquefied Gas Fires on Water, Combustion 
Science and Technology, Vol. 35, Issue 1-4, 33-57, ISSN: 0010-2202 
Mudan, K. S. (1984). Thermal Radiation Hazards from Hydrocarbon Pool Fires, Progress in 
Energy and Combustion Science, Vol. 10, 59-80, ISSN: 0360-1285 
Oka, H. & Ota, S. (2008). Evaluation of Consequence Assessment Methods for Pool Fires on 
Water Involving Large Spills from Liquefied Natural Gas Carriers, Journal of Marine 
Science and Technology, Vol. 13, No. 2, 178-188, ISSN: 0948-4280 
Oka, H. (2009). Consequence Analysis of Pool Fire Hazards from Large-Scale Liquefied Natural 
Gas Spills Over Water, Hydrocarbon World, Vol. 4, Issue 1, 90-93, ISSN: 1753-3899 
Qiao, Y.; West, H. H. & Sam Mannan, M., et al. (2006). Assessment of the Effects of Release 
Variables on the Consequences of LNG Spillage onto Water Using FERC Models, 
Journal of Hazardous Materials, Vol. 130, 155-162, ISSN: 0304-3894 
Raj, P. K. (2007). LNG Fires: A Review of Experimental Results, Models and Hazard 
Prediction Challenges, Journal of Hazardous Materials, Vol. 140, Issue 3, 444-464, 
ISSN: 0304-3894 
Rew, P. J. & Hulbert, W. G. (1996). Development of Pool Fire Thermal Radiation Model, 
Health and Safety Executive Contract Research Report, No. 96/1996, ISBN: 0717610845 
Rodean, H. C.; Hogan, W. J. & Urtiew, H. C., et al. (1984). Vapor Burn Analysis for the 
Coyote Series LNG Spill Experiments, UCRL-53530, Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory, Livermore, California 
Schneider, A. L. (1980). Liquefied Natural Gas Spills on Water: Fire Modeling, Journal of Fire 
and Flammability, Vol. 12, No. 4, 302-313, ISSN: 0022-1104 
Spaulding, M. L.; Craig Swanson, J. & Jayko, K., et al. (2007). An LNG Release, Transport, 
and Fate Model System for Marine Spills, Journal of Hazardous Materials, Vol. 140, 
488-503, ISSN: 0304-3894 
Spicer, T. O. & Havens, J. A. (1987). Field Test Validation of the DEGADIS Model, Journal of 
Hazardous Materials, Vol. 16, 231-245, ISSN: 0304-3894 
www.intechopen.com
Consequence analysis of large-scale liqueied natural gas spills on water 569
 
larger than a certain critical value, there is little influence on the consequences regardless of 
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conventional and latest LNGCs, respectively. In the vapor dispersion scenario, on the other 
hand, the critical diameters for the distance to the LFL are approximately 3 and 4 m for the 
two size LNGCs, respectively. This inconsistency is attributed to the singularly long 
evaporation duration of an LNG pool in the transitional spill range. These singular solutions 
obtained from the pool spread model indicate the lack of appropriate dynamic nature for 
transitional spills in the present integral approach. 
Therefore, it is important to develop a simple, but accurate pool spread model without 
dependence on spill types. On the other hand, it should be noted that practical consequence 
assessment methods can generally provide only rough estimates of the magnitude of effects 
for incidents involving large LNG release on water because of the variability in actual 
incident circumstances as well as the uncertainty inherent in the methods used. 
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